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**Immigration is Obama’s top priority, it will pass and capital is key**

**Matthews, 10/16/13** (Laura, International Business Times, “2013 Immigration Reform Bill: 'I'm Going To Push To Call A Vote,' Says Obama2013 Immigration Reform Bill: 'I'm Going To Push To Call A Vote,' Says Obama” http://www.ibtimes.com/2013-immigration-reform-bill-im-going-push-call-vote-says-obama-1429220)

When Congress finally passes a bipartisan bill that kicks the fiscal battles over to early next year, the spotlight could return to comprehensive immigration reform before 2013 ends.

At least that’s the hope of President Barack Obama and his fellow Chicagoan Rep. Luis Gutierrez, D-Ill., chairman of the Immigration Task Force of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus and one of the most vocal advocates for immigration reform in the House of Representatives.

“When we emerge from this crazy partisan eruption from the Republicans, there will be a huge incentive for sensible Republicans who **want to repair some of the damage they have done** to themselves,” Gutierrez said in a statement. “Immigration reform remains the one issue popular with both Democratic and Republican voters on which the two parties can work together to deliver real, substantive solutions in the Congress this year.”

Reforming the status quo has consistently been favored by a majority of Americans. Earlier this year, at least two-thirds of Americans supported several major steps to make the system work better, according to a Gallup poll. Those steps include implementing an E-verify system for employers to check electronically the immigration status of would-be employees (85 percent), a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, (72 percent), an entry-exit check system to make sure people who enter the country then leave it (71 percent), more high-skilled visas (71 percent) and increased border security (68 percent).

The Senate passed its version of a 2013 immigration reform bill in June that includes, but is not limited to, a pathway to citizenship for immigrants without documentation and doubling security on the southern border. But that measure has stalled in the House, where Republicans are adamant they will take a piecemeal approach.

The momentum that lawmakers showed for reform has been sapped by the stalemate that that has shut down the government for 16 days and brought the U.S. to the brink of default. The Senate has agreed on Wednesday to a bipartisan solution to break the gridlock.

When the shutdown and default threat is resolved (for a time), that’s when Obama will renew his push to get Congress to move on immigration reform. On Tuesday the president said reform will become his **top priority.**

“Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform,” Obama told Univision affiliate KMEX-TV in Los Angeles. “And if I have to join with other advocates and continue to speak out on that, and keep pushing, I’m going to do so because I think it’s really important for the country. And now is the time to do it.”

The president pointed the finger at House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, for not allowing the bill to be brought to the floor for a vote. Boehner had promised that the Senate’s bill would not be voted on unless a majority of the majority in the House supports it -- the same principle he was holding out for on the government shutdown before he gave in.

“We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate,” Obama said. “The only thing right now that’s holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives. So we’re going to have to get through this crisis that was unnecessary, that was created because of the obsession of a small faction of the Republican Party on the Affordable Care Act.”

Republicans are opposing the Democratic view of immigration reform because of its inclusion of a 13-year path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. They said this amounted to “amnesty.” Some Republicans prefer to give them legal resident status instead.

Immigration advocates have also been urging Obama to use his executive authority to halt the more than 1,000 deportations taking place daily. Like the activists, Gutierrez said the government shutdown didn’t do anything to slow the number of daily deportations.

Some Republicans who welcomed Sen. Ted Cruz’s filibuster over Obamacare because it shifted the focus from immigration.

“If Ted [didn’t] spin the filibuster, if we don’t make this the focus, we had already heard what was coming,” Rep. Louie Gohmert, R-Texas, told Fox News on Tuesday. “As soon as we got beyond this summer, we were going to have an amnesty bill come to the floor. That’s what we would have been talking about. And that’s where the pivot would have been if we had not focused America on Obamacare.”

Still, pro-immigration advocates are hopeful they can attain their goal soon. “With **more prodding from the president** and the American people,” Gutierrez said, “we can get immigration reform legislation passed in the House and signed into law.”

#### Their 1AC proves that the plan would be a political disaster and not feasible b/c of administrative costs and market thinness

Haims and Dick, RAND Policy Analysts, 12 – \*Marla C. Haims (Former RAND Global Health Initiative Director, Ph.D. and M.S. in industrial and systems engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison; B.A. in psychology, Miami University) and Andrew W. Dick (Senior RAND Economic analyst, Ph.D. in economics, Stanford University), “Extending U.S. Medicare to Mexico; Why It's Important to Consider and What Can Be Done,” Fall 2012, article 5, http://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/health-quarterly/issues/v2/n3/05.html.) EL

The four policy options presented above differ greatly in their practical and political feasibility. In addition, while these options could be adopted in combination, the relatively thin market in Mexico makes this unlikely, as the duplication of administrative costs would likely prove prohibitive, and the success of at least one option (i.e., Option 3 to expand Medicare Advantage) would rely on market share. Practical Feasibility In the U.S. economic and political environment of the foreseeable future, the adoption of an extension to Medicare—which could be perceived as increasing overall Medicare program costs and reducing U.S. employment—would be difficult to achieve. There are several features of the Mexican and U.S. health economies, however, that suggest that a policy to extend Medicare to Mexico might be beneficial to all parties. American taxpayers might benefit from a reduced total cost of Medicare: To the extent that an extension of Medicare, through any of the above options, induces Medicare beneficiaries to substitute higher-cost U.S. health care services with lower-cost Mexican services, overall Medicare expenditures might be reduced if the extended benefit is suitably structured. In addition, beneficiaries would likely be better off because of improved access to local care and reductions in the pecuniary and time costs of travel to the United States for care. Finally, Mexicans might benefit from an expanded health economy and improved quality of care. The potential for a mutually beneficial outcome certainly justifies further consideration of extending Medicare to Mexico. Although the numbers are questionable and estimates variable, the size of the Medicare-eligible population in Mexico will never reach a threshold justifying the per person costs of administering Option 1, particularly given the other options currently available to Medicare-eligible beneficiaries living in Mexico (i.e., buying into IMSS or paying out-of-pocket). Option 2, with reimbursement rates set at some fraction of the U.S.-based payment, or set to cover some fraction (perhaps 100 percent) of charges, would still require an administrative infrastructure to address issues of fraud and abuse, certification and quality, and coordination across multiple insurers. It could, however, be developed and implemented in coordination with existing programs for Americans abroad, including TRICARE for Life and FEHB plans, as well as Mexican institutions, such as the Mexican MoH. Cost considerations strongly favor Option 2 over Option 1 for a full-scale Medicare Abroad program. The practical feasibility of Option 3 (expansion of Medicare Advantage) would depend on whether such insurance plans could be supported by the market. In Mexico, the costs of administrating such a plan (borne by the private insurer) could be prohibitive given the number of Medicare-eligible retirees in Mexico. Although both the current Medicare requirement that services be provided within the United States and the relatively small population of potential enrollees residing in Mexico may explain the nonexistence of these programs today, a relaxing of the requirement along with the anticipated substantial growth of potential enrollees by 2040 could make these programs viable. Option 4 is perhaps the most practically feasible, as it requires no new program and can be implemented incrementally. By rolling out reform incrementally, initial investments in the development and operation of administrative infrastructures could be modest. In addition, the program could be shaped to address the most important needs of beneficiaries as it is rolled out, addressing the highest-priority areas with each successive incremental expansion. Option 1 is economically and practically not viable given the expected administrative costs and the relatively small population affected. Given its reliance on the market, Option 3 is also unlikely to be viable even with the anticipated large population increase among potential enrollees. Multiple Medicare Advantage Plans competing for enrollees would result in very high administrative costs that would have to be borne by plan enrollees. Options 2 and 4—developing a new Medicare indemnity insurance plan to cover services abroad or expanding Medigap—seem the most viable. Over time, Options 2 and 4 could eventually look very similar. Option 4, however, has the practical advantage of allowing for incremental expansion, minimizing both practical and political risks. For example, immediate incremental changes may require only changes to Medicare regulation, while more fundamental reforms under each of the four options would require statutory changes through an act of Congress. Political Feasibility Although a Medicare Abroad program in Mexico, based on any of the above options, might benefit Medicare-eligible beneficiaries, the U.S. government, and Mexico, there are three substantial political issues that would have to be overcome: (1) a call for parity across other countries; (2) the perception of unfairness among U.S. resident American taxpayers, who might not feel they are equally benefiting; and (3) the perception of U.S. jobs being lost to Mexico among both health professionals and the general population. Part of the justification for considering an extension of Medicare could come from Mexico's participation in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). However, there is likely a much stronger economic case to be made for Medicare extension to Mexico than to Canada or some other countries enjoying free trade agreements with the United States (e.g., Israel, Australia, Korea, Bahrain). Would it be politically viable for Medicare to adopt dissimilar policies for different countries, particularly within NAFTA? Americans residing in Canada (or other countries) might raise legitimate concerns about equity. Similarly, the Canadian government might raise concerns about the burdens Americans impose on the Canadian health care system. Another set of problems could arise around U.S. resident taxpayers articulating their distaste for Medicare funds being directed at programs that likely never will benefit them. Public relations, including communications on the potential cost savings for Medicare and responding to reports of fraud and abuse, would need to be emphasized. Even if fraud and abuse cases are limited and amount to a relatively small fraction of program costs, they could generate considerable political pressure. Thus, significant oversight and auditing would likely be required in any of the options, adding to administrative costs. Finally, the magnitude of the resultant decrease in demand for Medicare-related services in the United States as a result of extending Medicare to Mexico will not likely be great enough to significantly affect any given individual physician, physician group, or institutional provider. There may be a perception, however, that extending Medicare to Mexico would reduce demand for services—and thus related employment—in the United States, generating opposition from physician groups, such as the American Medical Association, and the general population.

#### Immigration reform generates an effective base of IT experts - solves cyberterror

\*top 20 firms conclude H1-B visa requestors are oversees – increasing IT experts, the majority of which are overseas, cannot come to the US, talented students that have tremendous ability to develop tech and scientific advances don’t have the ability to come to the US – collapses response mechanisms

**McLarty 09 –** (Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates and Former White House Chief of Staff and Task Force Co-Chair, “U.S. Immigration Policy: Report of a CFR-Sponsored Independent Task Force”, 7-8, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/19759/us\_immigration\_policy.html)

We have seen, when you look at the table of the top 20 firms that are H1-B visa requestors, at least 15 of those are IT firms. And as we're seeing across industry, much of the hardware and software that's used in this country is not only manufactured now overseas, but it's developed overseas by scientists and engineers who were educated here in the United States. We're seeing a lot more activity around cyber-security, certainly noteworthy attacks here very recently. It's becoming an increasingly dominant set of requirements across not only to the Department of Defense, but the Department of Homeland Security and the critical infrastructure that's held in private hands. Was there any discussion or any interest from DOD or DHS as you undertook this review on the security things about what can be done to try to **generate a more effective group of IT experts** here in the **U**nited **S**tates, many of which are coming to the U.S. institutions, academic institutions from overseas and often returning back? This potentially puts us at a competitive disadvantage going forward. MCLARTY: Yes. And I think your question largely is the answer as well. I mean, clearly we have less talented students here studying -- or put another way, more talented students studying in other countries that are gifted, talented, really have a **tremendous ability to develop** these kind of **tech**nology **and scientific advances**, we're going to be put at an increasingly disadvantage. Where if they come here -- and I kind of like Dr. Land's approach of the green card being handed to them or carefully put in their billfold or purse as they graduate -- then, obviously, that's going to **strengthen**, I think, our system, **our security needs**.

#### A successful cyber-attack ensures accidental nuclear war

**Fritz 09 –** (Jason, BS – St. Cloud, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control”, Study Commissioned on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, July, www.icnnd.org/Documents/Jason\_Fritz\_Hacking\_NC2.doc)

The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under this rule two authorized personnel must be present and in agreement during critical stages of nuclear command and control. The President must jointly issue a launch order with the Secretary of Defense; Minuteman missile operators must agree that the launch order is valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must agree that the order to launch is valid. In the US, in order to execute a nuclear launch, an Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a preformatted message that directs nuclear forces to execute a specific attack. The contents of an EAM change daily and consist of a complex code read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and videos posted to YouTube provide insight into how these work. These are issued from the NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the designated hierarchy of command and control centres. Once a command centre has confirmed the EAM, using the two-man rule, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the weapons and the message is sent out. These messages are sent in digital format via the secure Automatic Digital Network and then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters of the High Frequency Global Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to nuclear capable submarines via Very Low Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF submarine communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF reception. Some reports have noted a Pentagon review, which showed a potential “electronic back door into the US Navy’s system for broadcasting nuclear launch orders to Trident submarines” (Peterson 2004). The investigation showed that cyber terrorists could potentially infiltrate this network and insert false orders for launch. The investigation led to “elaborate new instructions for validating launch orders” (Blair 2003). Adding further to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing control over submarine launched nuclear missiles; The Royal Navy announced in 2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft Windows operating system on its nuclear submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating system, apparently based on Windows XP, is not as alarming as the advertising of such a system is. This may attract hackers and narrow the necessary reconnaissance to learning its details and potential exploits. It is unlikely that the operating system would play a direct role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain. Knowledge of the operating system may lead to the insertion of malicious code, which could be used to gain accelerating privileges, tracking, valuable information, and deception that could subsequently be used to initiate a launch. Remember from Chapter 2 that the UK’s nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the central command has been destroyed. Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a decapitating strike could also be used to engage fail-deadly systems. Open source knowledge is scarce as to whether Russia continues to operate such a system. However evidence suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand, was an automated system set to launch a mass scale nuclear attack in the event of a decapitation strike against Soviet leadership and military. In a crisis, military officials would send a coded message to the bunkers, switching on the dead hand. If nearby ground-level sensors detected a nuclear attack on Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications links with top military commanders, the system would send low-frequency signals over underground antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military sites, these rockets in turn would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via radio relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to some Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos and on mobile launchers can be fired automatically. (Broad 1993) Assuming such a system is still active, cyber terrorists would need to create a crisis situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool it into believing a decapitating strike had taken place. While this is not an easy task, the information age makes it easier. Cyber reconnaissance could help locate the machine and learn its inner workings. This could be done by targeting the computers high of level official’s—anyone who has reportedly worked on such a project, or individuals involved in military operations at underground facilities, such as those reported to be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy mountains in the central southern Urals (Rosenbaum 2007, Blair 2008) Indirect Control of Launch Cyber terrorists could cause **incorrect information** to be transmitted, received, or displayed at nuclear command and control centres, or shut down these centres’ computer networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket was mistaken by Russian early warning systems as a nuclear missile launched from a US submarine. A radar operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who decided to alert the highest levels. Kavkaz was implemented, all three chegets activated, and the countdown for a nuclear decision began. It took eight minutes before the missile was properly identified—a considerable amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be decided upon (Aftergood 2000). Creating a false signal in these early warning systems would be relatively **easy** using computer network operations. The real difficulty would be gaining access to these systems as they are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are transmitting wirelessly, that may **provide an entry point**, and information gained through the internet may reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for gaining entrance to the closed network. If access was obtained, a false alarm could be followed by something like a DDoS attack, so the operators believe an attack may be imminent, yet they can no longer verify it. This could add pressure to the decision making process**,** and if coordinated precisely, could appear as a first round EMP burst. Terrorist groups could also attempt to launch a non-nuclear missile, such as the one used by Norway, in an attempt to fool the system. The number of states who possess such technology is far greater than the number of states who possess nuclear weapons. Obtaining them would be considerably easier, especially when enhancing operations through computer network operations. Combining traditional terrorist methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities neither could accomplish on their own. For example, radar stations might be more vulnerable to a computer attack, while satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a laser beam, thus together they deny dual phenomenology. Mapping communications networks through cyber reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated scanning devices created by more experienced hackers can be readily found on the internet. Intercepting or spoofing communications is a highly complex science. These systems are designed to protect against the world’s most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are recurring gaffes, and the very nature of asymmetric warfare is to bypass complexities by finding simple loopholes. For example, commercially available software for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice commands within the command and control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it back together in order to issue false voice commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16). Spoofing could also be used to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a **nuclear war.** “ “In June 1998, a group of international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site of India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and put up a spoofed web page showing a mushroom cloud and the text “If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream” (Denning 1999). Hacker web-page defacements like these are often derided by critics of cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no significant harm. However, web-page defacements are becoming more common, and they point towards alarming possibilities in subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit letter of apology from Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website (Grant 2007). This took place amid the confusion of mass DDoS attacks, real world protests, and accusations between governments.

#### **Living **in accord with the Tao precludes taking action to prevent death. As mere humans, we are oblivious to the overarching meaning of the universe and thus any action we take is unproductive and immoral – 3 impacts – ethics, value to life, and a self-fulfilling prophecy.********Kirkland 98**** -  Ph.D. in East Asian Languages and Cultures, specialist in Asian Religions, Associate Professor of Religion at UGA, (1996, Russell Kirkland, "’RESPONSIBLE NON-ACTION’ IN A NATURAL WORLD : PERSPECTIVES FROM THE NEI-YEH, CHUANG-TZU, AND TAO-TE CHING" HARVARD CONFERENCE ON TAOISM AND ECOLOGY CB)

Once upon a time, several years ago, I had the opportunity to engage in a variety of teamteaching enterprises at Stanford University. At one time, my colleague Lee Yearley sought to impress upon students the differences between the thought of the Confucian thinker Mencius and the thought of the Taoist thinker Chuang-tzu. The starting point was Mencius' famous insistence that human nature is such that none of us would fail to be moved if we saw an infant facing imminent death, such as by falling into an open well; Chuang-tzu, meanwhile, presumably believed that humans are incapable of comprehending the true meaning of the events that constitute the context of our lives, and urged us to refrain from the delusion that we can correctly analyze those events and correctly govern the events that occur to us. To stimulate students' ruminations on these issues, Lee Yearley gave our students an assignment, to write a paper beginning with the following proposition: Mencius and Chuang-tzu are sitting together on a riverbank, when an infant was descried floating precariously on the river, apparently on its way to its death from drowning. The students' assignment was to describe what each man, in that situation, would do, and why.z His assumption was that as students wrestled with the thoughtcontent of each of the thinkers in question, students would have to grapple with the morally difficult imperative of Chuang-tzu's thought, which would ask us to forego intervention in the processes at work around us, even if such restraint should mean that innocent children should perish as a result. This presumed moral dilemma was intended to challenge students to wrestle meaningfully with the dilemma of the human condition: that is, that humans live with moral imperatives to do what seems to us to be good, at the same time that we realize that we cannot fully control the events that take place around us, and can probably not fully effect our will, despite our best intentions. Such, at least, was the apparent moral quandary into which Lee Yearley worked to lead the students in our class. One of my own students, however, quickly answered the assigned question, in an unexpectedly easy fashion. The assignment was to explain what Mencius and Chuang-tzu each would do, and why, so this student simply explained that Mencius would jump up to save the baby, for the obvious reasons, and that Chuang-tzu would do nothing whatsoever, because he had no reason to do so: Mencius was already out there saving the baby, so there was really nothing more for him to do. This example came to my mind when I began to ponder what the Taoists of ancient China would say about the ecological problems of the late twentieth century. If, so to speak, planet Earth is drifting precariously in the direction of presumable disaster, what would be the action that Chuang Chou and his contemporaries would have us take? In other words, would "Taoism," in that sense, provide a solution to the apparent moral dilemma that faces our planet in our own day and age, and if so, what form might that solution take? As some of the other presenters gathered here seem already to have suggested, it is commonly believed by some hopeful minds that Taoism provides a pretty solution to the presumed problems of the planet. But more careful thought suggests that Taoism might not offer happy solutions to the problems of the modern world. What if, for instance, the issue in the foregoing example was not a human baby floating in a river, but rather the species of the whooping crane, its continuance threatened by the encroachment of human civilization. If Chuang Chou were sitting by watching earth's species threatened with extinction, what would he really do, and why? The answer, I fear, is not certain to fill our hearts with sanguine certainty of the future of the cranes, or with sanguine happiness that Chuang Chou shares our desire to preserve them. In fact, the only logical answer to this latter-day challenge to Taoist values would seem to be that Chuang Chou would, as it were, watch the whooping cranes float down the river on their way to apparent extinction, and would do nothing whatsoever to interfere with the natural operations of the world. The only logical answer to this situation is that the Taoist sees no action to be required, for he trusts that the world is already operating as it is supposed to be operating, and **all human activity — no matter how well-intentioned — can add nothing of value to such operation**, and can logically only interfere with the course of nature as it is already unfolding. Just as Chuang-tzu would not dive into a river to save a floating baby, he would not take deliberate action to save the world from apparent destruction. It is, in fact, on this basis that one can, in fact, distinguish classical Taoists from classical Confucians: like modern Westerners, the Confucians generally assume that the world inherently tends toward chaos and requires the redemptive activity of human society, individually and collectively. But Taoists, as a rule, do not share the Confucian (or Western) fear of the natural processes of life, and consequently do not fear the extinction of the whooping cranes, nor do Taoists enjoin deliberate action to save the cranes, or even Earth as a whole, from extinction. In fact, according to what I shall refer, for the moment, as Taoist moral reasoning, it is, in fact**, morally objectionable for humans to presume that they are correct in their judgment of what constitutes an impending** ecological **danger**, or that corrective action is called for to prevent an apparent natural catastrophe. On the basis on the texts of classical Taoism, I contend that the only possible Taoist position is that humans who foresee impending ecological disaster should, as it were, sit down and shut up, and let the universe work. While it is also true that those who lead an authentically Taoist life are unlikely to contribute in substantial ways to any ecological degradation of the planet, that fact alone does not justify the conclusion that Taoist principles can justify remedial action to correct the effects of less-insightful humans of past and present. The Taoist answer to ecological problems, I shall argue, is always to be found in going contrary to the Confucians, who assume humans to have a special wisdom that is nowhere else found among the living things of the world: whereas a Confucian, like Mencius, would feel morally compelled to jump up and dive into the river of life's events to save a threatened species of tall, noisy birds, a Taoist, like Chuang-tzu, would feel morally compelled to refrain from doing so. In what follows, I will attempt to explain the moral reasoning that would compel Chuang Chou to watch the cranes on their apparent way to extinction, taking no action, despite the disquiet that such a prospect might produce within his heart/mind. The fundamental principle involved is that humans are not the all-knowing beings that we usually take ourselves to be, and that the activities that humans have taken with the intention to govern or improve the world have almost always proven, in the final analysis, to have been misguided and unjustified, and to have actually done more harm than good. The ultimate Taoist principle, I propose, is that there is a reality beyond the comprehension or control of human thought or activity, and that humans of the modern secular age need to beware the arrogant assumption that we are, in Western terms, the "God" of planet earth. The Taoist position, I shall argue, is that planet earth has no "God," and needs none, not even — or more correctly said, especially not — ourselves.

#### ****The alternative is to do nothing in order to appreciate the flow of the Tao – only inaction in face of interventionism solves.****

**Kirkland 96** – Ph.D. in East Asian Languages and Cultures, specialist in Asian Religions, Associate Professor of Religion at UGA (1996, Russell Kirkland, Ph.D. in East Asian Languages and Cultures, specialist in Asian Religions, Associate Professor of Religion at UGA, "The Book of the Way," 24-29 CB)

The focus of the Daode jing is something called "the Tao (or Dao)," a term that cannot adequately be translated. The text says that the Tao is "vague and subtle," and it never provides definitions. Instead, it employs metaphors to suggest the nature of the Tao, and to describe behaviors that are similar to its way of working. Most basically, the term Tao seems to denote a natural force that runs through all things and guides them through their natural course of development. It is an inexhaustible source of life and power, and is constantly at work in the world in subtle and imperceptible ways. Both its reality and its nature can be perceived by observing the world around us. However, most people have lost sight of the Tao, and have given way to unnatural behaviors that go contrary to it. The goal of the Daode jing is to persuade the reader to **abandon those behaviors, and to learn once again how to live in accord with the true course of life**. One can achieve those goals by appreciating the true nature of life, and modifying one's behavior to be more like that of the Tao. Specifically, the Tao is humble, yielding, and non-assertive. Like a mother, it benefits others selflessly: it gives us all life and guides us safely through it, asking nothing in return. This altruistic emphasis of the Daode jing has seldom been noticed, but it is one of the most important lessons that it draws from the observation of the natural world. Water, for instance, is the gentlest and most yielding of all things, yet it can overcome the strongest substances, and cannot itself be destroyed. More importantly, however, water lives for others: it provides the basis of life for all things, and asks nothing in return. If we learn to live like water does, we will be living in accord with the Tao, and its Power (De) will carry us safely through life. Such a way of life is called **wuwei**, usually translated as "**non-action**." Wuwei means foregoing all activity intended to effect desired ends. Instead, one should follow one's natural course and allow all other things to do likewise, lest our willful interference disrupt things' proper flow. Few modern readers have ever grasped the full radicality of the ideal of wuwei. Many of us today (like the ancient Chinese Confucians and Mohists) look at the world and see things that we think need correcting. The Daode jing would actually have us do nothing whatsoever about them. The repeated phrase "do nothing, and nothing will be undone" admonishes us to trust the Tao -- the natural working of things -- and never to do anything about anything. Actually, such is the most that anyone can do, because the Tao -- as imperceptible as it is -- is the most powerful force in existence, and nothing can thwart its unceasing operation.

#### Economic engagement is long-term strategy for promoting structural linkage between two economies – the plan is neither.

**Mastanduno, 1** – professor of Government at Dartmouth College (Michael, “Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice” http://web.archive.org/web/20120906033646/http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf

The basic causal logic of economic engagement, and the emphasis on domestic politics, can be traced to Hirschman. He viewed economic engagement as a long-term, transformative strategy. As one state gradually expands economic interaction with its target, the resulting (asymmetrical) interdependence creates vested interests within the target society and government. The beneficiaries of interdependence become addicted to it, and they protect their interests by pressuring the government to accommodate the source of interdependence. Economic engagement is a form of structural linkage; it is a means to get other states to *want* what you want, rather than to *do* what you want. The causal chain runs from economic interdependence through domestic political change to foreign policy accommodation.

#### Engagement towards a government must be conditional, the plan isn’t

**Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k** - \*Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND \*\*a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (Richard and Meghan, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf

Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.

#### That violates the word “its”.

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 05**

(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

#### 3. Good is not good enough – precise definition outweighs – don’t allow new 1AR answers to this card.

Resnick 01 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

CONCLUSION

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

#### Text: The United States federal government should develop a Medicare insurance program with the Mexican Ministry of Health for American citizens living in Mexico if and only if Mexico agrees to:

#### - Enhance transparency by protecting the free flow of information,

#### - Expand targeted performance-based funding to the Mexican states,

#### - Allow monitoring and reporting of crimes directly to a federal body,

#### - And increase police wages, training, and equipment.

#### Conditions key – creates political pressure to enact the counterplan.

Reyes et al 12, (Alex Velez-Green, Robin Reyes, and Anthony Ramicone, September, The Institute of Politics is a non-profit organization located in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “GOVERNMENTAL, JUDICIAL AND POLICE CORRUPTION,” http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files\_new/research-policy-papers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf)

Thirdly, recognizing that functioning police forces are essential to ensure the safety of noncorrupt officials as well as to maintain public safety and order, the U.S. should target aid to ¶ specific communities at the local level, creating secure cities one at a time and then exporting ¶ that model to other regions. Specifically, the Merida Initiative funding could be used as an ¶ incentive mechanism to entice officials at the state and local level to sign off on policies that ¶ would enhance transparency, allow for the overhaul of the local police forces, and allow ¶ monitoring and reporting of crimes directly to a federal body. This would achieve two ¶ objectives. First, it would overcome funding issues at the local levels. Second, it would help ¶ create local police forces that are better trained, better paid, and better equipped, but that ¶ remain independent of local political pressures by reporting directly to a federal agency.

#### That solves organized crime.

Sabet 10 (Daniel, May 2010, “Police Reform in Mexico: Advances and Persistent Obstacles,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexico Institute, University of San Diego Trans-Border Institute, Daniel Sabet is a visiting professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/dms76/policefiles/Sabet\_police\_reform.pdf)

At no time in Mexico’s history has there been a greater need for professional police forces. The ¶ current security crisis, which resulted in an estimated 6,587 organized crime related killings in ¶ 2009, has brought police reform to the top of the national agenda.1¶ While law enforcement ¶ should be the primary tool to address the country’s crime problems, the police are viewed as part ¶ of the problem rather than part of the solution. A brief review of the daily newspapers reveals ¶ problems such as (1) corruption and collusion with organized crime, (2) abuses of human rights ¶ in the form of torture, unwarranted search and seizure, violations to due process, and inversion of ¶ the presumption of innocence, and (3) ineffectiveness exemplified by the inability to stem the ¶ violence, poor investigation and intelligence gathering capabilities, and high rates of impunity. ¶ Evidence of these three problems has produced a deep seeded lack of confidence in the police, ¶ which ironically makes the police even less effective and further perpetuates corruption and ¶ abuse. ¶ Addressing Mexico’s security crisis will require creating an effective police force operating ¶ within the confines of the law.

#### That causes CBW warfare which escalates to extinction.

CSIS 9 (Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Revolution 6 - Conflict," Global Strategy Institute," gsi.csis.org/index.php?Itemid=59&id=30&option=com\_content&task=view)

The shift from interstate to intrastate war and the increasing capacity of non-state actors to commit acts of megaviolence reflect how patterns of conflict have changed since the end of the Cold War. Today warfare is increasingly described as “asymmetric.” Traditional military powers, like the United States, are confronted by increasingly atypical adversaries— non-state ideologues, transnational criminal syndicates, and rogue states— that employ unconventional tactics in wars ambiguous in both place and time. Today, conflict is more likely to occur between warring factions on residential streets than between armies on battlefields. As before, many belligerents still fight for power and/or wealth, but an increasing number are fighting purely for ideology. Acts of terrorism have become the major vehicle for their malcontent, especially for well-organized and well-funded Islamic groups like al-Qaeda. The attacks of September 11, 2001 and similar incidences in recent decades have shown that even small groups of terrorists can carry out sophisticated attacks that result in an incredible loss of life. The proliferation of nuclear and biological technologies only ups the ante for future incidences. [19] Terrorism and Transnational Crime Over the past few decades the size and scope of terrorists’ abilities have become truly alarming. Terrorist organizations have evolved from scrappy bands of dissidents into well-organized groups with vast human and capital resources. This situation is forcing governments around the world to develop strategies to both neutralize these groups where they operate and maintain security at home. The United States has met some success in combating terrorist organizations, killing high-level officials and isolating certain sub-groups, but the War on Terror has had the unintended consequence of forming “micro-actors,” individuals driven by foreign military operations to militant extremism. These individuals, or groups of individuals, operate in poorly organized cells and as such use internet technologies to spread their message and share plans of attack. Perhaps paradoxically, this disorganization and decentralization makes these groups a greater threat to the military as it is harder to detect and track them. [1] Terrorism has also had the effect of heightening tensions between sovereign nations. After the Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008, India and Pakistan neared war after India accused Pakistan of harboring terrorists and Pakistan refused to turn over individuals for prosecution. To finance their illegal activity, terrorist organizations are becoming involved in transnational crime, especially drug trafficking. Dr. Rachel Ehrenfeld, Director of the American Center for Democracy, has stated, “The huge revenues from the heroin trade fill the coffers of the terrorists and thwart any attempt to stabilize the region.” [2] Over the last two decades, we have witnessed a surge in transnational crime, in large part because of the dissolution of Cold War alliances that helped keep criminal syndicates in check. Organized crime activity is not limited to the smuggling of illicit drugs, but includes the trafficking of arms, drugs, and human beings. Weapons of Mass Destruction According to President Obama, “In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up.” [3] International mechanisms established in recent decades have by and large kept the nuclear ambitions of superpowers at bay. However, the fall of the Soviet Union and the increasing prevalence and power of criminal networks have made it more likely that a single actor could get his or her hands on a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). The term WMD is used to describe any weapons technology (radiological, chemical, biological, or nuclear) that is capable of killing a large number of people. [4] By and large it is believed that WMD pose the greatest threat in the possession of belligerent states like Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. However, experts are warning that a more urgent threat would come from WMD in the hands of non-state actors. Nuclear material and technical knowledge are frequently exchanged on the black market, especially in post-Soviet countries, where security personnel charged with guarding nuclear facilities are easily bribed into selling nuclear plans and materials. [5] With the help of the United States, Russia and its neighbors have made strides in securing these sites and improving oversight of the nuclear industry, but there is no telling how much material has been traded over the years. [6] The WMD threat does not only come from groups operating in the developing world, however, as recent biochemical attacks attest. The prime suspect in the anthrax attacks of 2001 was a government scientist, and the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway was committed by a religious organization that enjoyed official government recognition. The ease with which these materials have become available, especially through online resources, is forcing governments to restrict their use. International governing bodies will need to find an acceptable paradigm that allows for the benign applications of these technologies, as in power generation, while deterring the nefarious ones.

2. Latin American instability.

Bagley 1 (Bruce, “GLOBALIZATION AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: THE RUSSIAN MAFIA IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN,” School of International Studies at the University of Miami Coral Gables, November 15, http://www.as.miami.edu/international-studies/pdf/Bagley%20GLOBALIZATION%202.pdf)

The dangers and risks to Lain American governments and societies that emanate from expanding Russian mafiya activities within and outside their national borders are usually more indirect than direct, although nonetheless real because of their obliqueness. In Colombia, for example, Russian mafia arms-for-cocaine smuggling operations have unquestionably upgraded the FARC guerrillas’ arsenal and enhanced their firepower vis a vis the Colombian police and armed forces, thereby contributing to the intensification of the country’s internal conflicts. The fact that the Russian mafia appears equally willing to sell arms to Colombia’s rightwing paramilitaries may underscore their lack of ideological involvement in Colombia’s decades-old civil strife, but it in no way mitigates the profoundly negative consequences that their illicit activities hold for Colombian political stability and state security. The Russians’ international money laundering services are provided in a similarly non-partisan fashion -- for a price, they will launder drug trafficker, guerrilla or paramilitary money on an equal opportunity basis. In doing so, of course, they facilitate the clandestine movement of the narco-dollars that help underwrite the on-going violence in Colombia.[83] Even for those Latin American countries not engulfed in civil wars such as the one raging in Colombia, Russian illegal arms trafficking and arms-for-drugs deals in alliance with local criminal gangs significantly increase the firepower available to violent elements of society and make them more difficult and dangerous for law enforcement to control. Brazil’s favelas, for instance, have become virtual war zones, at least in part as a result of Russian drug and arms trafficking links with local criminal organizations in that country. Likewise, the Central American “maras” have become progressively better armed and threatening to social stability and state security throughout the Isthmus as a result of their linkages with Russian (along with Mexican, Colombian and North American) transnational organized crime groups. The Russian mafia is not, by any means, the only source of weapons in the region. The United States itself is a major purveyor of small arms throughout Latin America and the Caribbean and elsewhere in the world.[84] But given the political chaos and relative availability of black-market arms in Russia and most other former Soviet Bloc countries, Russian crime groups enjoy significant comparative advantages in this clandestine market and, thus, have emerged as major players in the international illicit arms trade.[85] The consequences for Latin America and the Caribbean are visible on a daily basis in the surging rates of gang warfare and violent crime registered in every major urban area in the region. Independent of the arms black-market, the Russian mafia’s criminal strategies and tactics for penetration into the region are inherently, even if indirectly, threatening to institutional stability and state security. Russian crime groups do not normally seek to displace the local criminal organizations ensconced in each Latin American or Caribbean country, but rather to cooperate with them in order to facilitate their own illegal operations and to elude detection and arrest. In doing so, they clearly strengthen the local crime groups with which they affiliate by providing them with expanded markets in Europe and Russia for contraband such as cocaine, heroin and methamphetamines, by sharing new smuggling routes into (and networks of protection and distribution in) these lucrative markets, and by helping to launder the profits derived from their illicit enterprises through Russian channels at home and abroad. The Russian mafia’s “marriage of convenience” with the Arrellano Felix cartel based in Tijuana, Mexico, illustrates the dangerous potential of such alliances. The May 3, 2001, 12 ton cocaine seizure on the Russian and Ukrainian-crewed Svesda Maru constituted the largest cocaine bust in U.S. maritime history. The money and arms obtained by the Arrellano Felix mob through their linkages with Russian crime groups unquestionably make the Tijuana cartel wealthier, more able to purchase Mexican police and political “protection” through bribery, and better armed and equipped to ward off rival gangs or to resist Mexican and U.S. law enforcement efforts mounted against them. The Russian’s preferred tactics of bribery, blackmail and intimidation tend to exercise corrosive pressures on key private and public sector institutions, thereby undermining individual states’ abilities to preserve the stable economic and social environment, effective law enforcement capacity and “level playing field” required to promote legal business activity and attract foreign investment essential to long-term economic growth. Traditional and longstanding patterns of patrimonial rule, personalism, clientelism, and bureaucratic corruption throughout Latin America have encouraged and facilitated Russian crime groups’ resorts to these favored tactics (as they have for domestic criminal organizations as well). Time and again, many (although certainly not all) police and customs officials, military officers, judges, politicians, and businessmen have proven susceptible to such enticements in large and small countries alike throughout the region.[86] The Russian mafia’s expanding presence in Latin America and the Caribbean does not currently constitute a direct security threat to either the individual states of the region or to the United States. It does, however, contribute indirectly to the entire region’s growing economic, social and political turmoil and insecurity and thus poses a major challenge to economic growth, effective democratic governance and long-run regime stability throughout the hemisphere.

this adv is nonsensical—the status quo solves-- it says that in the case of an Asian war, if there was also instability in Mexico, we would have a hard time focusing on Asia—no evidence that Asia war is coming now

**Mexican economy growing and second half surge expected**

**Financial Times 7/22** (“Mexico: bouncing back?”, 7/22/13, http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/07/22/mexico-bouncing-back/#axzz2ZpODok4P)//WL

More signs perhaps that Mexico’s economy is sputtering back to life? On Monday, the country’s statistical office INEGI said retail sales rose 0.7 per cent in May compared to April, following a drop the month before. The news comes just ten days after Mexico reported a rebound in industrial production for May. The latest retail figures will further add to the view among economists that the Mexican economy is set to bounce back in the second-half of this year after a lacklustre performance in the first half. “Mexico retail sales grew more strongly than expected in May”, wrote Marco Oviedo from Barclays, who was expecting a month-on-month seasonally adjusted increase of just 0.2 per cent. “The retail sales trend is back in positive territory…The confirmation of a positive result could suggest that economic activity in general is moving toward a stronger dynamism in Q3, as we currently expect.” In addition to May’s positive industrial production and retail sales numbers, there are other signs that Mexico’s economy is on the up. Car sales rose last month while the country’s supermarket and department stores association – which has more than 44,000 members – reported a 1.6 per cent increase in like-for-like sales for the month. Meanwhile, inflation – having risen to more than 4.5 per cent – now appears under control. In June, prices fell a bigger-than-expected 0.1 per cent. This takes inflation for the year to 4.09 per cent and puts it on track to end the year within the 3 to 4 per cent range forecast by the Mexican central bank. Still, that is not to say that Mexico has been immune from the sluggishness seen in the global economy. At the start of the year, many were expecting Latin America’s second largest economy to expand by 3.5 per cent this year, compared to 3.9 per cent in 2012. Fast forward a couple of months and that forecast has been thrown out of the window by most experts. The consensus now is for GDP to expand by 2.7 per cent.

**And, Mexico's economy is resilient**

**TWI 12** (Thomas White International, January 27, 2012,“Mexico: The glow of economic resilience lightens the shadows of violence”, http://www.thomaswhite.com/world-markets/mexico-the-glow-of-economic-resilience-lightens-the-shadows-of-violence/ )Wave3seo

But, surprisingly, the Mexican economy has so far remained somewhat impervious to all that violence. GDP growth last year was relatively healthy and the expected slowdown during the current year is likely to be a minor dip rather than a steep fall. Domestic consumer demand has held up, supported by nearly $23 billion in remittances during 2011 from Mexicans working abroad. Industrial investments are flowing in from abroad, and last year were estimated by the UN at close to $18 billion. Despite higher consumer prices in recent months, inflation remains under control and has allowed the central bank to maintain interest rates relatively low.¶ It is interesting that much of the economy’s resilience is rooted in the sustained buoyancy in export shipments, especially of manufactured goods, when consumer demand in the U.S., the destination for most of Mexico’s exports, has not been particularly robust. This suggests Mexico’s improved export competitiveness and, in fact, Mexico has been steadily increasing its share in the total import basket of its northern neighbor. The most significant driver of this trend are rising labor and other costs in China and in neighboring Asian countries that are the principal suppliers into the U.S. market. Even though the average wages in Mexico are still higher than most developing countries in Asia, the competitive edge in that Far East region has gradually declined when aggregate costs are considered. The close proximity to the U.S., which allows greater logistical flexibility in response to short-term demand fluctuations, adds to Mexico’s luster in the eyes of large manufacturers.

**ASEAN solves stability**

**Noi 07 –** (Goh Sui Noi, @ Straits Times, 8-23-07 [Asean 'holds key to building stable East Asian region'; S'pore official says grouping plays vital role by providing neutral platform, lexis]

GOVERNMENTS in the East Asian region have realised that it is **in their nations' interests** to build a community to preserve stability for growth, a senior Singapore official has said. And building such a community depends on Asean's ability to integrate deeper and faster, said Mr Bilahari Kausikan, Second Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. In addition, a grouping of the region's think-tanks, which held a conference in Singapore, yesterday called for greater cultural exchanges to promote community-building. 'An East Asian community will...depend on Asean's ability to integrate deeper and faster and create a community of its own,' Mr Kausikan said on Tuesday. He explained that the complexity and sensitivity of relationships among major powers meant that Asean played an essential role in providing a relatively neutral platform for an East Asian architecture. 'This is the real meaning of the oft-repeated refrain 'Asean in the driver's seat',' he said. He added that this was the broader significance of the Asean Charter, which will be discussed at the next summit of the 10-nation grouping to be held in Singapore in November. The charter, which will give a legal basis to the grouping, is expected to deepen integration within Asean.

#### No overpopulation.

Wise, 1/9 – contributing editor at Travel + Leisure and Popular Mechanics, he has also written for The New York Times Magazine, Esquire, Details, Men’s Journal, and many others(Jeff, “About That Overpopulation Problem,” Slate, January 9, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future\_tense/2013/01/world\_population\_may\_actually\_start\_declining\_not\_exploding.html, SMS)

\*Cites UN Predictions and academic reports

The world’s seemingly relentless march toward overpopulation achieved a notable milestone in 2012: Somewhere on the planet, according to U.S. Census Bureau estimates, the 7 billionth living person came into existence. Lucky No. 7,000,000,000 probably celebrated his or her birthday sometime in March and added to a population that’s already stressing the planet’s limited supplies of food, energy, and clean water. Should this trend continue, as the Los Angeles Times noted in a five-part series marking the occasion, by midcentury, “living conditions are likely to be bleak for much of humanity.” A somewhat more arcane milestone, meanwhile, generated no media coverage at all: It took humankind 13 years to add its 7 billionth. That’s longer than the 12 years it took to add the 6 billionth—the first time in human history that interval had grown. (The 2 billionth, 3 billionth, 4 billionth, and 5 billionth took 123, 33, 14, and 13 years, respectively.) In other words, the rate of global population growth has slowed. And it’s expected to keep slowing. Indeed, according to experts’ best estimates, the total population of Earth will stop growing within the lifespan of people alive today. And then it will fall. This is a counterintuitive notion in the United States, where we’ve heard often and loudly that world population growth is a perilous and perhaps unavoidable threat to our future as a species. But population decline is a very familiar concept in the rest of the developed world, where fertility has long since fallen far below the 2.1 live births per woman required to maintain population equilibrium. In Germany, the birthrate has sunk to just 1.36, worse even than its low-fertility neighbors Spain (1.48) and Italy (1.4). The way things are going, Western Europe as a whole will most likely shrink from 460 million to just 350 million by the end of the century. That’s not so bad compared with Russia and China, each of whose populations could fall by half. As you may not be surprised to learn, the Germans have coined a polysyllabic word for this quandary: Schrumpf-Gesellschaft, or “shrinking society.” American media have largely ignored the issue of population decline for the simple reason that it hasn’t happened here yet. Unlike Europe, the United States has long been the beneficiary of robust immigration. This has helped us not only by directly bolstering the number of people calling the United States home but also by propping up the birthrate, since immigrant women tend to produce far more children than the native-born do.

#### Offshore balancing inevitable – attempts to shift away from it culminate in war.

**Walt 11** – [Stephen, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “What I told the Navy this year,” 6-10, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/10/what\_i\_told\_the\_navy\_this\_year]

I had the privilege of delivering a keynote speech to the Naval War College's Current Strategy Forum on Wednesday, and you can find a video of the talk here. The title of my talk was "The Twilight of the American Era," and my central point was that we are nearing the end of the unusual position of primacy that the United States has enjoyed since the end of World War II. In 1945, the United States produced about half of gross world product, we were a creditor nation with a trade surplus, and we had the world's largest armed forces and sole possession of atomic weapons. The Soviet Union had a large land army but not much else, and its economy was always decidedly inferior to ours. This position of primacy allowed the United States to create, maintain, and lead a political-economic-security order in virtually every part of the world, except for the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact itself. Not only did the United States play the leading role in institutions like the UN, IMF, World Bank, and GATT, but we also established a dominant security role in Europe through NATO and in Asia through bilateral treaties with Japan, Australia, South Korea, New Zealand and others. In the Middle East, the United States helped create and support Israel and also forged security partnerships with various Arab monarchies, thereby obtaining a predominant role there as well. U.S. hegemony was already well-established in the Western hemisphere, and though the U.S. didn't pay much attention to Africa, it did enough to preserve its modest interests there too. Over the next forty years, this position of primacy was challenged on several occasions but never seriously threatened. The United States lost the Vietnam War but its Asian alliances held firm, and China eventually moved closer to us in the 1970s. The Shah of Iran fell, but the United States simply created the Rapid Deployment Force and maintained a balance of power in the Gulf. Israel grew ever-stronger and more secure, and Egypt eventually realigned towards us too. And then the Soviet Union collapsed, which allowed the United States to bring the Warsaw Pact into NATO and spread market-based systems throughout the former communist world. This situation was highly unusual, to say the least. It is rare that any single power-let alone one with only 5 percent of the world's population -- is able to create and maintain a particular political and security order in almost every corner of the world. It was never going to last forever, of course, and three key trends are now combining to bring that era of dominance to an end. The first trend is the rise of China, which discarded the communist system that had constrained its considerable potential and has now experienced three decades of explosive growth. China's military power is growing steadily, and as I and other realists have noted, this trend will almost certainly lead to serious security competition in Asia, as China seeks to limit the U.S. role and as Washington strives to maintain it. The second trend is the self-inflicted damage to the U.S. economy, a consequence of the Bush administration's profligacy and the financial crisis of 2007. The United States faces a mountain of debt, the near-certainty of persistent federal deficits, and a dysfunctional political system that cannot seem to make hard choices. This situation does not mean the United States is about to fall from the ranks of the great powers, but **the contrast with earlier periods** -- and especially the immediate aftermath of World War II -- **is stunning**. Just look at our tepid response to the Arab spring and compare that with the Marshall Plan, and you get some idea of our diminished clout. The third trend is the emergence of several influential regional powers, who have managed to reform their own economies, gain greater confidence and independence, and (in some cases) throw off their previous deference to Washington. States such as Turkey, India, and Brazil are not about to become true global powers, but each has become more influential in its own neighborhood, is able to chart its own foreign policy course, and won't be inclined to defer to Washington's wishes. This is especially true for those states -- most notably Turkey -- where the U.S. image is now decidely negative. China's rise may eventually give many states diplomatic options, **further complicating America's ability to run a Washington-centered world order.** Make no mistake: these developments do not mean the United States is facing terminal decline, or about to drop out of the major power category. As I told the 2009 Strategy Forum, unlike Europe or Japan, the U.S. population is still increasing and America's long-term power potential remains high. The U.S. economy is still the world's most diverse and technologically sophisticated, and our military power will remain formidable even if defense budget faces significant cuts (as it should). The United States is not about to decline the same way that Britain did after World War II; in fact, it is almost certain to be the world's single most powerful state for some time to come. What is ending, however, is the "American Era": that unusual period of primacy where the United States could orchestrate lead a political/economic/security order almost everywhere. We didn't control the world, but we cast a long shadow virtually everywhere and we could usually make most things go our way. What does this mean going forward? It means the United States is going to have set priorities, and write off some areas or regions where its vital interests are not engaged or where those interests are not threatened. In particular, the United States should focus on preserving a balance of power in the key industrial areas of Europe and Asia and in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, while maintaining its position as the only great power in the Western hemisphere. We will need to get our allies to do more, however, and as the Libyan intervention shows, the only way to do that is to do rather less ourselves). But we will have to forego the costly moral crusades that neoconservatives and liberal interventionists love to drag us into, and that also means staying out of the costly business of "nation-building" (which we are not very good at anyway). In short, the United States will have to return to the strategy of "offshore balancing" that it followed for most of its history. In practice, this means drawing down our military presence in Europe (which is stable and democratic and faces no threats it can't handle itself), getting out of Iraq and Afghanistan and moving our forces there back offshore and over-the-horizon, and shifting more of our strategic attention to Asia, where China's rise is creating a number of new and potentially valuable partners. This is decidely not an "isolationist" strategy, insofar as the United States would remain diplomatically engaged around the globe and militarily committed in several key regions. But we would be much less inclined to intervention on other states' internal affairs. As you might expect, the audience at the War College seemed to like this analysis, because the Navy is central to making a strategy like this work. Offshore balance requires command of the sea, so that the United States can project power when and where it has to. Naval forces are also a useful way to signal commitment, but without creating the friction and resentment that large, on-shore deployments create. And though naval forces are not cheap, an approach that shifts more of the burden to others and doesn't try to remake societies that we don't understand is going to be more affordable both now and in the future. Bottom line: Offshore balancing is the right strategy for the 21st century, and a combination of external trends and internal constraints will almost certainly lead us to adopt some variable on it. **The only question is how quickly we make these adjustments, and how much more blood and treasure we squander before we do.**

#### Decline facilitates US multilateralism—paves the way for a soft landing that prevents their transition impacts.

He 10—Professor of Political Science at Utah State University [Kai He (Postdoctoral fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program at Princeton University (2009–2010) and a Bradley fellow of the Lynda and Harry Bradley Foundation (2009–2010), “The hegemon’s choice between power and security: explaining US policy toward Asia after the Cold War,” Review of International Studies (2010), 36, pg. 1121–1143]

\*Heg encourages power maximization

\*Decline forces them to worry about security. Leads to multilateralism/OSB

\*US willing to pay lock-in price to constrain peer competitor

\*1990’s prove

\*Multilateralism creates a soft landing during decline

When US policymakers perceive a rising or a stable hegemony, the anarchic nature of the international system is no longer valid in the mind of US policymakers because the preponderant power makes the US immune from military threats. In the self-perceived, hierarchic international system with the US on the top, power-maximisation becomes the strategic goal of the US in part because of the ‘lust for power’ driven by human nature and in part because of the disappearance of the security constraints imposed by anarchy. Therefore, selective engagement and hegemonic dominion become two possible strategies for the US to maximise its power in the world. The larger the power gap between the US and others, the more likely selective engagement expands to hegemonic dominion. When US policymakers perceive a declining hegemony in that the power gap between the hegemon and others is narrowed rather than widened, US policymakers begin to change their hierarchic view of the international system. The rapid decline of relative power causes US policymakers to worry about security imposed by anarchy even though the US may remain the most powerful state in the system during the process of decline. Offshore balancing and multilateralism, therefore, become two possible policy options for the US to maximise its security under anarchy. The possible budget constraints during US decline may lead to military withdrawals from overseas bases. In addition, the US becomes more willing to pay the initial ‘lock-in’ price of multilateral institutions in order to constrain other states’ behaviour for its own security.

US foreign policy towards Asia preliminarily supports the power-perception hegemonic model. When President George H. W. Bush came to power, the US faced ‘dual deficits’ even though the US won the Cold War and became the hegemon by default in the early 1990s. The domestic economic difficulty imposed a declining, or at least uncertain, hegemony to the Bush administration. Consequently, Bush had to withdraw troops from Asia and conducted a reluctant offshore balancing strategy in the early 1990s. Although the US still claimed to keep its commitments to Asian allies, the US words with the sword became unreliable at best.

During President Clinton’s first tenure, how to revive US economy became the first priority of the administration. The perception of a declining hegemon did not totally fade until the middle of the 1990s when the US economy gradually came out of the recession. Multilateral institutions, especially APEC, became Clinton’s diplomatic weapon to open Asia’s market and boost US economy. In addition, the US also endorsed the ARF initiated by the ASEAN states in order to retain its eroding political and military influence after the strategic retreats in the early 1990s.

However, the US ‘new economy’ based on information technology and computers revived policymakers’ confidence in US hegemony after the Asian miracle was terminated by the 1997 economic crisis. The second part of the 1990s witnessed a rising US hegemony and the George W. Bush administration reached the apex of US power by any measure in the early 21st century. Therefore, since Clinton’s second tenure in the White House, US foreign policy in general and towards Asia in particular has become more assertive and power-driven in nature. Besides reconfirming its traditional military alliances in Asia, the US deepened its military engagement in the region through extensive security cooperation with other Asian states.

The selective engagement policy of the US in the late 1990s was substantially expanded by the Bush administration to hegemonic dominion after 9/11. The unrivalled hegemony relieved US of concerns over security threats from any other states in the international system. The ‘lust for power’ without constraints from anarchy drove US policymakers to pursue a hegemonic dominion policy in the world. The ‘pre-emption strategy’ and proactive missile defence programs reflected the power-maximising nature of the hegemonic dominion strategy during the George W. Bush administration.

What will the US do in the future? The power-perception hegemonic model suggests that the US cannot escape the fate of other great powers in history. When US hegemony is still rising or at a stable stage, no one can stop US expansion for more power. When its economy can no longer afford its power-oriented strategy, the US will face the same strategic burden of ‘imperial overstretch’ that Great Britain suffered in the 19th century. However, the power-perception hegemonic model also argues that US foreign policy depends on how US policymakers perceive the rise and fall of US hegemony.

If historical learning can help US policymakers cultivate a prudent perception regarding US hegemony, the early implementation of offshore balancing and **multilateralism may facilitate the soft-landing** **of declining US hegemony**. More importantly, the real danger is whether the US can make a right choice between power and security when US hegemony begins to decline. If US policymakers cannot learn from history but insist on seeking more power instead of security even though US hegemony is in decline, the likelihood of hegemonic war will increase. However, if US policymakers choose security over power when US hegemony is in decline, offshore balancing and multilateralism can help the US maximise security in the future anarchic, multipolar world. Pg. 1141-1143

#### Heg doesn’t solve stability but destabilizes the world turning their impact

Cambanis 12 – [Thanassis, fellow at The Century Foundation, is the author of “A Privilege to Die: Inside Hezbollah’s Legions and Their Endless War Against Israel”, “The lonely superpower,” http://bostonglobe.com/ideas/2012/01/22/the-lonely-superpower/FRkSf1s5n9lXku4VqvEtqJ/story.html]

Now, however, with a few decades of experience to study, a young international relations theorist at Yale University has proposed a provocative new view: **American dominance has destabilized the world in new ways, and the United States is no better off in the wake of the Cold War**. In fact, he says, **a world with a single superpower** and a crowded second tier of distant competitors **encourages**, rather than discourages, **violent conflict**—not just among the also-rans, but even involving the single great power itself. In a paper that appeared in the most recent issue of the influential journal International Security, political scientist Nuno P. Monteiro lays out his case. America, he points out, has been at war for 13 of the 22 years since the end of the Cold War, about double the proportion of time it spent at war during the previous two centuries. “I’m trying to debunk the idea that a world with one great power is better,” he said in an interview. “If you don’t have one problem, you have another.” Sure, Monteiro says, the risk of apocalyptic war has decreased, since there’s no military equal to America’s that could engage it in mutually assured destruction. But, he argues, the lethal, expensive wars in the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, and Afghanistan have proved a major drain on the country. Even worse, Monteiro claims, America’s position as a dominant power, unbalanced by any other alpha states actually **exacerbates dangerous tensions rather than relieving them**. Prickly states that Monteiro calls “recalcitrant minor powers” (think Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan), whose interests or regime types clash with the lone superpower, will have an incentive to provoke a conflict. Even if they are likely to lose, the fight may be worth it, since concession will mean defeat as well. This is the logic by which North Korea and Pakistan both acquired nuclear weapons, even during the era of American global dominance, and by which Iraq and Afghanistan preferred to fight rather than surrender to invading Americans. Of course, few Americans long for the old days of an arms race, possible nuclear war, and the threat of Soviet troops and missiles pointed at America and its allies. Fans of unipolarity in the foreign policy world think that the advantages of being the sole superpower far outweigh the drawbacks -- a few regional conflicts and insurgencies are a fair price to pay for eliminating the threat of global war. But Monteiro says that critics exaggerate the distinctions between the wars of today and yesteryear, and many top thinkers in the world of security policy are finding his argument persuasive. If he’s right, it means that the most optimistic version of the post-Cold War era -- a “pax Americana” in which the surviving superpower can genuinely enjoy its ascendancy -- was always illusory. In the short term, a dominant United States should expect an endless slate of violent challenges from weak powers. And in the longer term, it means that Washington shouldn’t worry too much about rising powers like China or Russia or the European Union; America might even be better off with a rival powerful enough to provide a balance. You could call it the curse of plenty: Too much power attracts countless challenges, whereas a world in which power is split among several superstates might just **offer** a **paradoxical stability**. From the 1700s until the end of World War II in 1945, an array of superpowers competed for global influence in a multipolar world, including imperial Germany and Japan, Russia, Great Britain, and after a time, the United States. The world was an unstable place, prone to wars minor and major. The Cold War era was far more stable, with only two pretenders to global power. It was, however, an age of anxiety. The threat of nuclear Armageddon hung over the world. Showdowns in Berlin and Cuba brought America and the Soviet Union to the brink, and the threat of nuclear escalation hung over every other superpower crisis. Generations of Americans and Soviets grew up practicing survival drills; for them, the nightmare scenario of thermonuclear winter was frighteningly plausible. It was also an age of violent regional conflicts. Conflagrations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America spiraled into drawn out, lethal wars, with the superpowers investing in local proxies (think of Angola and Nicaragua as well as Korea and Vietnam). On the one hand, superpower involvement often made local conflicts far deadlier and longer than they would have been otherwise. On the other, the balance between the United States and the USSR reduced the likelihood of world war and kept the fighting below the nuclear threshold. By tacit understanding, the two powers had an interest in keeping such conflicts contained. When the Soviet Union began its collapse in 1989, the United States was the last man standing, wielding a level of global dominance that had been unknown before in modern history. Policy makers and thinkers almost universally agreed that dominance would be a good thing, at least for America: It removed the threat of superpower war, and lesser powers would presumably choose to concede to American desires rather than provoke a regional war they were bound to lose. That is what the 1991 Gulf War was about: establishing the new rules of a unipolar world. Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, Monteiro believes, because he miscalculated what the United States was willing to accept. After meeting Saddam with overwhelming force, America expected that the rest of the world would capitulate to its demands with much less fuss. Monteiro compared the conflicts of the multipolar 18th century to those of the Cold War and current unipolar moment. What he found is that the unipolar world isn’t necessarily better than what preceded it, either for the United States or for the rest of the world. It might even be worse. “Uncertainty increases in unipolarity,” Monteiro says. “If another great power were around, we wouldn’t be able to get involved in all these wars.” In the unipolar period, a growing class of minor powers has provoked the United States, willing to engage in brinkmanship up to and including violent conflict. Look no further than Iran’s recent threats to close the Strait of Hormuz to oil shipping and to strike the American Navy. Naturally, Iran wouldn’t be able to win such a showdown. But Iran knows well that the United States wants to avoid the significant costs of a war, and might back down in a confrontation, thereby rewarding Iran’s aggressive gambits. And if (or once) Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, it will have an even greater capacity to deter the United States. During the Cold War, on the other hand, regional powers tended to rely on their patron’s nuclear umbrella rather than seeking nukes of their own, and would have had no incentive to defy the United States by developing them. Absent a rival superpower to check its reach, the United States has felt unrestrained, and at times even obligated, to intervene as a global police officer or arbiter of international norms against crimes such as genocide. Time and again in the post-Cold War age, minor countries that were supposed to meekly fall in line with American imperatives instead defied them, drawing America into conflicts in the Balkans, Somalia, Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This wasn’t what was supposed to happen: The world was supposed to be much safer for a unipolar superpower, **not more costly and hazardous**.

# BLOCK

#### You MUST be able to establish a theoretical baseline for topicality evaluating anything else – “knowing it when you see it” is an awful standard

Hayden 13 (Dr. Craig Hayden is an assistant professor in the International Communication Program at American University's School of International Service. “Engagement” is More Convenient than Helpful: Dissecting a Public Diplomacy Term.”, http://intermap.org/2013/06/20/engagement-is-more-convenient-than-helpful-dissecting-a-public-diplomacy-term/

The term engagement matters because it implies a specific practice, to facilitate a certain objective or outcome, and yet it doesn’t actually identify a practice. And as Wallin notes, it’s hard to discern engagement in relation to public diplomacy if we don’t have some standards or definition. Public diplomacy watchers and scholars may “know it when they see it,” but I’m not sure how this helps provide constructive critique.

#### Unipolarity is destroying bipartisan compact needed to sustain support for multilateralism—makes our policies erratic and incoherent.

Kupchan & Trubowitz 7—Professor of International Affairs @ Georgetown University & Professor of Government @ University of Texas-Austin [Charles A. Kupchan (Senior Fellow @ Council on Foreign Relations, and Henry A. Kissinger Scholar at the Library of Congress) & Peter L. Trubowitz (Senior Fellow @ Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law), “Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall 2007), pp. 7–44]

The conditions that sustained liberal internationalism have of late been rapidly disappearing, dramatically weakening its grip on the nation’s politics. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, U.S. primacy has reduced the incentives for Republicans and Democrats alike to adhere to the liberal internationalist compact. Unipolarity has heightened the geopolitical appeal of unilateralism, a trend that even the threat of transnational terrorism has not reversed. Unipolarity has also loosened the political discipline engendered by the Cold War threat, leaving U.S. foreign policy more vulnerable to growing partisanship at home. “Red” and “Blue” America disagree about the nature of U.S. engagement in the world; growing disparities in wealth have reawakened class tensions; and political pragmatism has been losing ground to ideological extremism.

The polarization of the United States has dealt a severe blow to the bipartisan compact between power and cooperation. Instead of adhering to the vital center, the country’s elected officials, along with the public, are backing away from the liberal internationalist compact, supporting either U.S. power or international cooperation, but rarely both. President Bush and many Republicans have abandoned one side of the liberal internationalist compact: multilateralism has received little but contempt on their watch. Meanwhile, the Democrats have neglected the other side: many party stalwarts are uneasy with the assertive use of U.S. power. As the partisan gyre in Washington widens, the political center is dying out, and support for **liberal internationalism is dying with it**. According to Jim Leach, one of the Republican moderates to lose his House seat in the 2006 midterm elections, “[The United States’] middle has virtually collapsed. And how to reconstruct a principled center, a center of gravity in American politics, may be the hardest single thing at this particular time.”5

Prominent voices from across the political spectrum have called for the restoration of a robust bipartisan center that can put U.S. grand strategy back on track.6 According to Democratic Senator Hillary Clinton, “For more than a half a century, we know that we prospered because of a bipartisan consensus on defense and foreign policy. We must do more than return to that sensible, cooperative approach.” Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney echoes this sentiment: “It seems that concern aboutWashington’s divisiveness and capability to meet today’s challenges is the one thing that unites us all. We need new thinking on foreign policy and an overarching strategy that can unite the United States and its allies.”7

These exhortations are in vain. The halcyon era of liberal internationalism is over; the bipartisan compact between power and partnership has been effectively dismantled. If left unattended, the **political foundations of U.S. statecraft will** continue to **disintegrate**, exposing the country to the dangers of an erratic and incoherent foreign policy. To avoid this fate, U.S. leaders will have to fashion a new brand of internationalism—one that will necessarily entail less power and less partnership if it is to have a chance of securing broad domestic support. To find a new equilibrium between the nation’s commitments abroad and its polarized politics at home, the United States will need a grand strategy that is as selective and judicious as it is purposeful. Pg. 8-10

#### AND, unipolarity directly trades off with US leadership.

Ikenberry 6—Professor of Politics and International Affairs @ Princeton University [G. John Ikenberry, Liberal International Theory in the Wake of 911 and American Unipolarity, 22 January 2006, pg. <http://tinyurl.com/6v3vtyy>]

Liberalism and American Hegemony - A final crisis point in liberal internationalism is that the postwar liberal project depended on enlightened American hegemony—and now that hegemony is more problematic. Like the balance of power, American hegemony has been more of a pre-condition for the emergence of liberal order than its champions might admit. But the character of that hegemony is under strain and changing.

For half a century, the United States held the keys to global order—and in many ways it still does today. If America engages in the right amount of commitment and restraint—anchoring its power in partnerships, alliances, multilateral institutions, "special relationships," and governance regimes -- the overall international system will tend to remain stable, open, and integrated. The world has, in effect, "contracted out" to the United States to provide global governance. The United States provides public goods, frameworks of cooperation, "good offices," and an enlightened but U.S.-centered system of rules and modes of doing geopolitical business. In return, the world "bandwagons" with the U.S. rather than resists or balances against it. This special type of open or liberal American hegemony trumps any other type of rival global order—and all the key players in world politics know this to be true. So no great power or regional grouping has an incentive to challenge or overturn the current order. It is a quintessential American vision—the great diversity of peoples and societies around the world will together troop down a grand pathway to modernity. Again, if the United States understands the logic of its own system and runs it correctly, this American-style liberal hegemonic order can last indefinitely.

A grand bargain stands behind this American-led liberal order. In the past, the United States provided global “services”—such as security protection and support for open markets—which made other states willing to work with rather than resist American preeminence. The public goods provision tended to make it worthwhile for these states to endure the day-to-day irritations of American foreign policy. But the trade-off seems to be shifting. Today, the United States appears to be providing fewer global public goods while at the same time the irritations associate with American dominance appear to be are growing.

It might be useful to think of this dynamic this way: the United States is unique in that it is simultaneously both the provider of “global governance” -- through what has tended in the past to be the exercise of “liberal” hegemony—and it is a great power that pursues its own national interest. America’s liberal hegemonic role is manifest when it champions the WTO, engages in international rule or regime creation, or reaffirms its commitment to cooperative security in Asia and Europe. Its great power role is manifest, for example, when it seeks to protect its domestic steel or textile industry. **When it acts as a liberal hegemon, it is seeking to lead or manage the global system of rules and institutions; when it is acting as a nationalist great power, it is seeking to respond** to domestic interests and **its relative power position**. My point is that today, these two roles—liberal hegemon and traditional great power—are increasingly in conflict.30

So **the danger to liberal internationalism lies with its greatest champion.** The United States does not appear to be doing as much today as in the past to sponsor and operate within a system of consensual rule-based governance. Why the United States is less willing to do so is actually a complex issue. Some of it is very specifically about the Bush administration—and therefore these biases and viewpoints will pass from the scene eventually as Bush and his team leave office. But America’s global position and the structure of incentives that this setting generates is also part of the explanation. American unipolarity seems to have created problems in how the U.S. thinks about the provision of international rules, institutions, and public goods.

CONCLUSION - The United States, together with allied European and East Asian partners, created a distinctive type of international order—organized around open markets, social bargains, intergovernmental institutions, and cooperative security. This political order was cemented by both the hegemonic power of the United States and the unusual bonds of cooperation that are possible among democracies. Today this order is in jeopardy. The United States is deeply ambivalent about making institutional commitments and binding itself to other states—ambivalence and hesitation that has been exacerbated by the end of the Cold War, American unipolarity, and new security threats. But the United States still possesses profound incentives to build and operate within a liberal rule-based order. Just as importantly, that order is now not simply an extension of American power and interests—it has taken on a life of its own. American power may rise or fall and its foreign policy ideology may wax and wane between multilateral and imperial impulses—but the wider and deeper liberal global order is now a reality that America itself must accommodate itself to.

\*US key - US provides the framework of cooperation

\*Multilat allows the world to bandwagon instead of resist

\*Multilat = open market, intergovernmental institutions, & cooperative security

#### Only the transition solves disease.

Weber et al 07– [Steven, professor of political science and director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, and Ely Ratner, all Ph.D. candidates at U.C., Berkeley and research fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center, Foreign Policy, January/February, 2007, Issue 158, l/n]

\*Hegemony prevents disease solutions – that’s Fidler – the US will be focused on keeping other countries under its control instead of the threat of diseases – poor countries where diseases are most commonly developed due to close proximity with farm animals breeds extreme diseases –

The same is true for global public health. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease. Humans cannot outsmart disease, because it just evolves too quickly. Bacteria can reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes, while it takes us decades to come up with a new generation of antibiotics. Solutions are only possible when and where we get the upper hand. Poor countries where humans live in close proximity to farm animals are the best place to breed extremely dangerous zoonotic disease. These are often the same countries, perhaps not entirely coincidentally, that feel threatened by American power. Establishing an early warning system for these diseases--exactly what we lacked in the case of SARS a few years ago and exactly what we lack for avian flu today--will require a significant level of intervention into the very **places that don't want it**. That will be true as long as **international intervention means American interference**. The most likely sources of **the next** ebola or HIV-like **pandemic** are the countries that simply won't let U.S. or other Western agencies in, including the World Health Organization. Yet the threat is too arcane and not immediate enough for the West to force the issue. What's needed is **another great power** to take over a piece of the work, a power that has more immediate interests in the countries where diseases incubate and one that is seen as less of a threat. As long as the United States remains the world's lone superpower, we're not likely to get any help. Even after HIV, SARS, and several years of mounting hysteria about avian flu, the world is still not ready for a viral pandemic in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. America can't change that alone.

#### Attempts to sustain heg cause Russian war.

**Press TV 09** – [“Medvedev lashes out at US hegemony,” Sept 15 http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=106209&sectionid=351020602]

Russia's President has slammed America's global dominance saying all nations have the right to remark on the policies of a state whose actions affect the world.

 Speaking at the opening of a global security conference in the central Russian city of Yaroslavl on Monday, Dmitry Medvedev said those problems of one country, **have the potential to lead to international conflict.**

 "This happens immediately and incompetence and reluctance to solve one's own problems inflict damage not only to your country but to a huge number of other countries," he added.

 The Russian president also lashed out at what he thought the "ill-thought-out" policies of a country that led to the global financial melt down.

 Medvedev did not refer to the United States by name but the target of his comments was clear.

 His remarks came shortly before the US President Barack Obama delivered a key speech in New York, where he described the global economic crisis as Washington and Wall Street's "collective failure".

 Earlier in March the Kremlin had suggested that the international community should have a say when the world's richest countries make decisions with global implications.

 Medvedev's comments further developed those ideas, attacking efforts by any party to advance what he called "utopian projects of global supremacy … 'Global Caliphate' or 'Benevolent Hegemony'".

 There can be no "high-flown justification for military adventures, suppression of rights and freedoms -- of any illegal activities," he stressed.

#### Extinction.

Helfand and Pastore 09 **–** [Ira Helfand, M.D., and John O. Pastore, M.D., are past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility.

March 31, 2009, “U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat”, http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT\_pastoreline\_03-31-09\_EODSCAO\_v15.bbdf23.html]

President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to Wednesday in London during the G-20 summit. They must not let the current economic crisis keep them from focusing on one of the greatest threats confronting humanity: the danger of nuclear war. Since the end of the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. There remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals remain on ready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million Americans would die in the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape with huge swaths of the country blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant. They would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide. If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere — blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species, including perhaps our own, would become extinct. It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event. But is this true? We know of five occcasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S. or Russia believed it was under attack and prepared a counter-attack. The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995, when the Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of nuclear weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today.

#### Asian war is unlikely – all potential conflicts are solved by regional stability initiatives throughout the region

Bitzinger and Desker 08 – (senior fellow and dean of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies respectively (Richard A. Bitzinger, Barry Desker, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival, December 2008, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com-/678328\_731200556\_906256449.pdf)

The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnationa terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common eopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely.

#### **AFF Choice checks –** we won’t read the counterplan against conditional affs, but against unconditional affs it’s core neg ground.

Kahl and Brimley 8 — Colin Kahl, Assistant Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, and Shawn Brimley, Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 2008 (“The Case for Conditional Engagement in Iraq,” Policy Brief — Center for a New American Security, March 6th, Available Online at http://www.cnas.org/node/155, Accessed 07-15-2013)

President Bush and his successor have only three basic choices on strategy for Iraq: unconditional engagement, conditional engagement, or unconditional disengagement. Only a policy of conditional engagement can help translate recent security gains into something more sustainable.

#### Topic Education – the core question of economic engagement is whether or not it should be conditional – the two are in tension with one another.

Kim and Kang 9 — Sung Chull Kim, Professor of Northeast Asian Studies at the Hiroshima Peace Institute, and David C. Kang, Professor of International Relations and Business at the University of Southern California, 2009 (“Introduction: Engagement as a Viable Alternative to Coercion,” *Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative*, Edited by Sung Chull Kim, Published by SUNY Press, ISBN 1438427867, p. 9)

The five states, anchored by the Six-Party Talks, have had a common goal, the nuclear disarmament of North Korea. However, this goal is not the first priority of each state; each state has its own additional—sometimes more important—goals for engagement with North Korea. Accordingly, the type and the logic of each state's engagement strategy differ from those of every other state (see Table 1.1). In bilateral relations with North Korea, there are specific and important differences within these two types of engagement: conditional and unconditional. Japan takes a mostly coercive approach, and the United States maintains conditional engagement; China and Russia (and South Korea of the Roh administration) maintain unconditional engagement. The point is that all of these different types of engagement are in tension with one another. The five states' effort to remain in concert as they try to end North Korea's nuclear ambitions constitute a challenging issue.

#### Best literature base.

Busch 9 — Benjamin C. Busch, Master’s Candidate at the Naval Postgraduate School, Major in the United States Air Force, holds a B.S. from the United States Air Force Academy, 2009 (“Cognitive Bargaining Model: An Analysis Tool for Third Party Incentives?,” Master’s Thesis Submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School, December, Available Online at http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2009/Dec/09Dec\_Busch.pdf, Accessed 07-16-2013, p. 3-4)

To answer how to maximize the effects of incentives, it is necessary to look to academic literature for insight. Positive influence strategies are a growing body of literature in the academic world, which notably resurged after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. As the world transitioned away from a bipolar world, within which there was a realist dominated foreign policy relationship, many noticed that the tough stances [end page 3] prescribed by realism were not having the desired effect. Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Syria all endured the toughest U.S. sanctions and best diplomatic efforts with little effect. People began to remember that the, “primary goal of foreign policy is to change a state’s desires, not necessarily defeat them militarily.”12 The following review of literature on positive incentives in this thesis is important for three reasons. It provides a basis for where incentives fit into overall influence strategies, outlines the current thoughts and debates surrounding positive incentives, and identifies some important gaps in knowledge.

#### **Obama leaks.**

Thompson 08, Michael, staff writer for Associated Content, 11-5-. [Associated Content, The Obama Administation’s First Leak, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1182373/rahm\_emanuel\_the\_obama\_administrations\_pg2\_pg2.html?cat=9]

So how does candidate Obama's camp spring virtually no leaks during a 20-month campaign, but then unleash a gusher of a leak within hours of his acceptance speech? Does this portend to more things to come? Past presidents such as Clinton and Ronald Reagan went so far as to limit participation in their most crucial White House discussions, so distressed were they by endless leaks to the press. Biden infamously has said that a hostile foreign power likely will test Obama within six months. It seems that on the domestic front, Barack Obama already is being tested by leaks within 24 hours.

#### So does the federal government.

Wilson and Dilulio 98, Professors of Political Science and UCLA and Princeton, James Q. Wilson and John J. [American Government: Institutions and Policies, p. 291]

American government is the leakiest in the world . The bureaucracy, members of Congress, and the White House staff regularly leak stories favorable to their interests. Of late the leaks have become geysers, gushing forth torrents of insider stories . Many people in and out of government find it depressing that our government seems unable to keep anything secret for long . Others think that the public has a right to know even more and that there are still too many secrets. However you view leaks, you should understand why we have so many. The answer is found in the Constitution. Because we have separate institutions that must share power, each branch of government competes with the others to get power. One way to compete is to try to use the press to advance your pet projects and to make the other side look bad . There are far fewer leaks in other democratic nations in party because power is centralized in the hands of a prime minister, who does not need to leak in order to get the upper hand over the legislature, and because the legislature has too little information to be a good source of leaks. In addition, we have no Official Secrets Act of the kind that exists in England; except for a few matters, it is not against the law for the press to receive and print government secrets.

#### 3. Time Frame – counterplan requires 5 more policies to be implemented before the aff – ‘Resolved’ implies immediacy.

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### 4. Certainty of the plan – the counterplan only occurs if Mexico says yes – “Should” is mandatory.

Nieto 9 – Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [\*\*15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [\*\*16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [\*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).